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Why is this Symposium so disappointing? The topic "Judges as Tort
Lawmakers" conveys a distinct implication that we will hear about the
capacity of the ablest in the judiciary to improve their creation of
common law tort liability. The three crushing and intertwined liabili-
ties of tort liability itself are its uncertainties, delays, and transaction
costs, especially in the case of personal injury. One would hope that
the very distinguished panel of tort scholars and other authorities as-
sembled here would focus again and again on these blatant shortcom-
ings, and perhaps even offer some solutions.
Instead, by starting the first session with a figure generally thought
to be the greatest American judge ever to focus on tort law, Cardozo,'
we heard concentration on what I would term relative minutiae. One
certainly cannot blame Cardozo's very thorough and perceptive biog-
rapher-Professor Andrew Kaufman-for this: he was just reporting
the facts. As one concerned with the broader aspects of tort law's
performance, Cardozo, it turns out, was something of a bust (though
Kaufman was far too elegant to put it so crudely).
Cardozo, then, despite his many tort opinions and scholarly lectur-
ing, never gave much thought to tort law's overall performance. It is
not that his era was not confronted with such matters, as Professor
Kaufman indicated. Cardozo practiced tort law, among other special-
ties, and ascended to the bench in an era that saw, amidst great con-
troversy relevant to present debates, the abandonment of tort liability
for the first great wave of accidents that had engulfed modern soci-
ety-namely, workplace accidents. True, he presumably would not
have ruled worker's compensation unconstitutional as the New York
* The Samuel H. McCoy, II Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A. 1951, Dartmouth
College; J.D. 1954, Harvard University.
1. Incidentally, for those like Professors Landsman and Galanter, devoted to ever-expanding
tort law, it is provocative to recall that the most famous opinion of the most prominent judge
ever to be identified with tort law was one by Cardozo limiting tort liability. See Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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Court of Appeals did in his time,2 had he been sitting then. Certainly
his great rival in tort scholarship on the bench, Holmes, crisply ruled
workers compensation constitutional. 3 But unlike Holmes,4 Cardozo
never addressed in any of his writings the key issue raised by workers
compensation-the adequacy of common law tort principles in an age
of technology and insurance.
With this ominous beginning, the Symposium, if anything, went
downhill because Professor Kaufman, as indicated above, was only re-
porting the unhappy facts. Other participants here had a choice as to
where they could come out. The second session, for example, peopled
by Professors Eisenberg, Finley, Green, Kiely, and Shapo, saw its
speakers agreeably sink themselves into the Talmudic (or is it Jesuiti-
cal?) intricacies of products liability law-urging on occasion further
expansion of this swamp, with too little focus on the uncertainties,
delays, and transaction costs it imposes.
On the subject of tort law's uncertainty, consider the recent state
supreme court case of Montana v. Stanko,5 where the Supreme Court
of Montana held a statute that in effect adopted the common law stan-
dard of fault as the basis of criminal liability for operating a motor
vehicle at excessive speed unconstitutionally vague. 6 The statute, said
the court, not only failed to give a "person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what [was] prohibited," but "imper-
missibly [delegated] basic policy matters to ... judges and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dan-
gers of arbitrary and discriminatory application .. .7
Of course, technically, the Stanko decision does not invalidate com-
mon law standards, as opposed to criminal standards, identical though
they may be. But surely the decision ought to shake one's confidence
in the justice and reliability of common law standards of negligence.
After all, a criminal defendant has far more safeguards than his civil
counterpart. Indeed, they are often seriatim the same person, with the
criminal proceeding dispositive as a practical matter of the civil one.
The criminal case is pursued at the discretion of a prosecutor, exer-
cised presumably in the public interest as to whether to prosecute. A
2. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
3. See N.Y. Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
4. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881); see also DAVID ROSEN-
BERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES: HIs THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY 134 (1999).
5. 974 P.2d 1139 (Mont. 1998).
6. Id. at 1138. "A person operating ... a vehicle ... shall drive the vehicle in a careful and
prudent manner.., so as not to... unreasonably endanger the life, limb, or property.... of [any
other] person entitled to the use of the street or highway." Id. at 1135.
7. Id. at 1136.
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tort suit, on the other hand, is prosecuted by a private attorney
pledged only to his client's own advantage, undissuaded by any sym-
pathetic or extenuating circumstances surrounding the defendant's
conduct. Furthermore, the prosecutor must prove the case beyond a
reasonable doubt, whereas prosecutors of civil cases need only prove
their case by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, any penalty
exacted in the criminal case is normally, at least for a first offense,
relatively small, whereas a civil defendant can be threatened with
huge financial losses in excess of his often limited insurance coverage.
If, as a practical matter, damages over and above insurance coverage
are rarely exacted from a defendant, think of the injured claimant
whose violation of the identical contributory or comparative negli-
gence standard can lead to the forfeiture in damages of hundreds of
thousands of dollars or more, which no criminal proceeding would
dream of exacting.
In sum, if the "reasonable care" standard is nakedly unconstitu-
tional as applied to motorists in criminal cases, how appealing is it as
applied to civil cases? Or indeed, how appealing is it as applied to
providers of goods and services where the criteria are much more dif-
ficult to apply than in comparatively simple motor vehicle cases? Inci-
dentally, courts' attitudes toward common law tort standards as a
criterion for liability can be wondrously inconsistent. This phenome-
non is illustrated by one court ruling them unconstitutional as applied
in criminal cases, while other courts rule them so sacrosanct that legis-
lative alterations in civil cases are also unconstitutional. 8
None of this is new. A generation ago, John Frank, a former Yale
law professor, and for years one of the most scholarly practitioners in
the country, elucidated a tragic flaw of American law in its exploding
creation of numerous complex "decision points."
As Robert Keeton and Alan Widiss summarized Frank's thesis:
The law maker's choice of an evaluative criterion [calling for a con-
siderable measure of discretion in applying a criterion such as fault]
confronts the law administrator with a type of decision point that is
especially costly both because such a criterion has a capacity for
generating numerous sub-points as factors to be taken into account
[such as those for determining whether a product is defective] and
8. See The State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, Judge, 715 N.E. 2d 1062
(Ohio 1999); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (11. 1997). William Glaberson, Ohio
Supreme Court Voids Legal Limits on Damage Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1999, at A9; William




because its generality and imprecision reduce predictability and
thereby impede the settlement process .... 9
Tlirning then from the law's complexity to its concomitant delays-
inevitable while all that complexity is dealt with-this subject was al-
luded to when Michael Green referred to a products liability case in
which a new trial was ordered after thirteen years of litigation.10 One
can bet the court was totally unembarrassed by such a dilatory per-
formance. A related article in this Symposium by a co-author and
myself reports on our review of four leading torts casebooks which
ignore such delays.1 We found that in a sample of fifty-one personal
injury cases, the average length of time between incident and appellate
opinion was 6.94 years. Many took ten or more years, with a compar-
atively large number (twenty-three) involving, additionally, remands
or new trials ordered by the appellate judges.12 Only eighteen out of
fifty-one cases were approved at the appellate level. But not once did
either the casebook editors or the judges writing the opinions ever
allude to the delay, no matter how lengthy.13
As to transaction costs incurred during all that delay dealing with all
that complexity, the recent tobacco litigation has raised the issue to
farcical levels, if it were not so tragic. To use Senator Moynihan's
revealing concept of "defining deviancy down,"'1 4 society seems to
have long reconciled itself to claimants' lawyers becoming hugely
wealthy multi-millionaires in the course of helping the maimed and
injured. But the new challenge to our society's capacity to further
define deviancy down is presented by tobacco litigation which now
makes claimants' lawyers billionaires. Are not they supposed to be
fiduciaries gaining recompense for the afflicted? (Let me admit my
interest to you. I was part of a group's so far-failed attempt to place a
statutory limit on counsel fees in the tobacco cases of, say, $4,000 an
hour-rather a lavish limit itself, but one that would eliminate about
80% of the fees). 15
9. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 17 n.3 (1988) (citing JOHN
FRANK, AMERICAN LAW-THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 85-110 (1969)).
10. See Michael D. Green, The Road Less Well Traveled (And Seen): Contemporary Law
Making in Products Liability, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377 (1999).
11. Jeffrey O'Connell & Craig A. Stanton, Justice Delayed is... Delay Ignored: The Indiffer-
ence of Judges and Law Professors to Legal Lassitude, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 489 (1999).
12. Id. at 491-94.
13. Id.
14. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, MILES TO Go 136-67 (1996).
15. See Lester Brickman, Want to Be a Billionaire? Sue a Tobacco Company, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 30, 1998, at All (discussing the outrageous amounts of money attorneys receive in contin-
gency fees from tobacco companies).
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Well, one could go on, but what do we hear of this at this Sympo-
sium? Not nearly enough. As just one of many counter examples that
could be cited, in the session on new torts we hear an exegesis on
"enabling torts" whereby the liability of an aunt who buys a car for
her alcoholic nephew who then crashes into the plaintiff, is litigated. 16
Other similarly technical matters are dealt with by speaker after
speaker.
This is not to say that there is no place in this conference for such
technical matters. It is only to lament such a relatively uniform focus.
I listened in vain at every session, despite much elegance and learning
in the presentations, for enough material that addressed tort law's fun-
damental flaws.
Such myopia in our discipline reminds me fearfully of our medical
colleagues. The medical profession, is, I am afraid, considerably more
prestigious than ours, but similarly went on for generations ignoring
its own increasing profligacy, and then in a few short years, faced an
abrupt revolution with a concomitant loss of so much of its precious
professional independence-as well as its fees. 17
It is, I suggest, imperative for lawyers, especially legal scholars, to
be thinking not so much about the types of relatively marginal issues
focused on at this conference-matters about which many of us are so
learned and skilled-but about tort law's essential shortcomings.
In this connection, what can the courts do, either with scholars' ad-
vice or without? As just one example, in the formulation of the new
Restatement Third of Products Liability, I undertook a long, persistent
colloquy with a very patient reporter, Jim Henderson. I pushed very
hard to gain acknowledgment of the legitimacy of pre-accident waiv-
ers of full-scale tort liability by consumers of goods, in return for
prompt payment of economic losses of wages and medical expenses.
After much to-ing and fro-ing, this phraseology emitted:
Disclaimers, Limitations, Waivers, and Other Contractual Exculpa-
tions as Defenses to Products Liability Claims for Harm to Persons
Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or other
distributors, waivers by product purchasers, and other similar con-
tractual exculpations, oral or written, do not bar or reduce other-
wise valid products liability claims against sellers or other
distributors of new products for harm to persons.
16. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 435 (1999).
17. Ewe E. Reinhardt, Should Physicians Unionize? No, Patients Would Pay the Price, WALL
ST. J., July 7, 1999, at A22.
1999]
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d. Waiver of rights in contractual settings in which product purchas-
ers posses both adequate knowledge and sufficient economic power.
The rule in this Section applies to cases in which commercial prod-
uct sellers attempt unfairly to disclaim or otherwise limit their liabil-
ity to the majority of users and consumers who are presumed to lack
information and bargaining power adequate to protect their inter-
ests. This Section does not address whether consumers, especially
when represented by informed and economically powerful con-
sumer groups or intermediaries, with full information and sufficient
bargaining power, may contract with product sellers to accept cur-
tailment of liability in exchange for concomitant benefits, or
whether such consumers might be allowed to agree to substitute al-
ternative dispute resolution mechanisms in place of traditional adju-
dication. When such contracts are accompanied by alternative
nontort remedies that serve as an adequate quid pro quo for reduc-
ing or eliminating rights to recover in tort, arguments may support
giving effect to such agreements. Such contractual arrangements
raise policy questions different from those raised by this Section and
require careful consideration by the courts.
Comment d .... See, e.g., O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability by
Contract: With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. Ill. L. F. 59,
65-71 .... Also see Vol. II, The American Law Institute, Reporters'
Study: Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury 517-536 (1991)
.... This Section does not address the wisdom of such proposals. It
speaks only to traditional disclaimers that function unfairly to deny
or limit liability to persons who lack either information or bargain-
ing power to protect their interests.18
Admittedly, this is not exactly a ringing endorsement, but it may be
a start. After all, should not courts be receptive to contracts that
strike a bargain between the desires of accident victims for prompt
compensation of actual losses and of producers of goods and services
to provide such? This is especially called for when one considers the
sweeping immunity from any tort liability that judges afford them-
selves, and their rationale that they could not discharge their duties if
somebody was constantly looking over their shoulders to impose
liability. 19
At any rate, so say I.
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 (1998).
19. Jeffrey O'Connell & Ralph M. Muoio, The Beam in Thine Eye, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 491.
[Vol. 49:497
